

USING DECISION PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY

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ABSTRACT. There are several public key establishment protocols as well as complete public key cryptosystems based on allegedly hard problems from combinatorial (semi)group theory known by now. Most of these problems are *search problems*, i.e., they are of the following nature: given a property \mathcal{P} and the information that there are objects with the property \mathcal{P} , find at least one particular object with the property \mathcal{P} . So far, no cryptographic protocol based on a search problem in a non-commutative (semi)group has been recognized as secure enough to be a viable alternative to established protocols (such as RSA) based on commutative (semi)groups, although most of these protocols are more efficient than RSA is.

In this paper, we suggest to use *decision problems* from combinatorial group theory as the core of a public key establishment protocol or a public key cryptosystem. Decision problems are problems of the following nature: given a property \mathcal{P} and an object \mathcal{O} , find out whether or not the object \mathcal{O} has the property \mathcal{P} .

By using a popular decision problem, the *word problem*, we design a cryptosystem with the following features: (1) Bob transmits to Alice an encrypted binary sequence which Alice decrypts correctly with probability “very close” to 1; (2) the adversary, Eve, who is granted arbitrarily high (but fixed) computational speed, cannot positively identify (at least, in theory), by using a “brute force attack”, the “1” or “0” bits in Bob’s binary sequence. In other words: no matter what computational speed we grant Eve at the outset, there is no guarantee that her “brute force attack” program will give a conclusive answer (or an answer which is correct with overwhelming probability) about any bit in Bob’s sequence.

1. INTRODUCTION

In search for more efficient and/or secure alternatives to established cryptographic protocols (such as RSA), several authors have come up with public key establishment protocols as well as with public key cryptosystems based on allegedly hard *search problems* from combinatorial (semi)group theory, including the conjugacy search problem [1, 12], the homomorphism search problem [9, 20], the decomposition search problem [7, 12, 19], the subgroup membership search problem [21]. All these are problems of the following nature: given a property \mathcal{P} and the information that there are objects with the property \mathcal{P} , find at least one particular object with the property \mathcal{P} from a pool \mathcal{S} of objects.

From the very nature of these problems, one sees that security of the corresponding cryptographic protocols relies heavily on the assumption that the adversary has limited (typically, subexponential) computational capabilities. Indeed, there is usually a natural way to recursively enumerate elements of the pool \mathcal{S} ; the adversary can therefore just go over \mathcal{S} one element at a time until he hits one with the property \mathcal{P} (assuming that checking the latter can be done efficiently). This is what is usually called the “brute force” attack.

In this paper, we suggest to use *decision problems* from combinatorial group theory as the core of a public key establishment protocol or a public key cryptosystem. Decision problems are problems of the following nature: given a property \mathcal{P} and an object \mathcal{O} , find out whether or not the object \mathcal{O} has the property \mathcal{P} . Decision problems may allow us to address (to some extent) the ultimate challenge of public key cryptography: to design a cryptosystem that would be secure against (at least, some)

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“brute force” attacks by an adversary with essentially unlimited computational capabilities. More precisely, our computational model is as follows. We explain to the adversary, in detail, how our cryptosystem works and allow him to choose, *up front*, any speed of computation that he would like to have to attack it, but after he has made his choice, he cannot change it, i.e., he cannot accelerate his computation beyond the limit he has chosen for himself.

A particular decision problem that we consider here is the *word problem* which is: given a recursive presentation of a group G and an element $g \in G$, find out whether or not $g = 1$ in G . From the very description of the word problem we see that it consists of two parts: “whether” and “not”. We call them the “yes” and “no” parts of the word problem, respectively. If a group is given by a recursive presentation in terms of generators and relators, then the “yes” part of the word problem has a recursive solution because one can recursively enumerate all products of defining relators, their inverses and conjugates. However, the number of factors in such a product required to represent a word of length n which is equal to 1 in G , can be very large compared to n ; in particular, there are groups G with efficiently solvable word problem and words w of length n equal to 1 in G , such that the number of factors in any factorization of w into a product of defining relators, their inverses and conjugates is not bounded by any tower of exponents in n , see [18]. Furthermore, if in a group G the word problem is recursively unsolvable, then the length of a proof verifying that $w = 1$ in G is not bounded by any recursive function of the length of w .

We also note that the “no” part of the word problem in many groups is recursively unsolvable, and therefore the “brute force” attack described above will not be effective against this part. We have to point out though that there is no recursively presented group (or semigroup) that would have both “yes” and “no” parts of the word problem recursively solvable.

Based on these general observations, we design here a cryptographic protocol (see the next section) with the following features:

- (1) Bob transmits to Alice an encrypted binary sequence which Alice decrypts correctly with probability “very close” to 1;
- (2) The adversary, Eve, who is granted arbitrarily high (but fixed) computational speed, cannot positively identify (at least, in theory), by using a “brute force attack”, the “1” or “0” bits in Bob’s binary sequence. In other words: no matter what computational speed we grant Eve at the outset, there is no guarantee that her “brute force attack” program will give a conclusive answer (or an answer which is correct with overwhelming probability) about any bit in Bob’s sequence.

We note that long time ago, there was an attempt to use the word problem in public key cryptography [15], but it did not meet with success, for several reasons. One of the reasons, which is relevant to the discussion above, was pointed out quite recently in [5]: the problem which is actually used in [15] is not the word problem, but the *word choice problem*: given $g, w_1, w_2 \in G$, find out whether $g = w_1$ or $g = w_2$ in G , provided one of the two equalities holds. In this problem, both parts are recursively solvable for any recursively presented platform group G because they both are the “yes” parts of the word problem, and therefore the word choice problem cannot be used for our purposes. **Thus, a similarity of our proposal to that of [15] is misleading, and ours seems to be the first proposal actually based on a decision problem.**

2. THE PROTOCOL

Here is a sketch of our cryptographic protocol; details are given in the following sections.

Protocol:

- (1) A pool of group presentations with efficiently solvable word problem is considered public (e.g. is part of Alice’s software).

- (2) Alice chooses randomly a particular presentation Γ from the pool, diffuses it by isomorphism-preserving transformations to obtain a diffused presentation Γ' , discards some of the relators and publishes the abridged diffused presentation $\hat{\Gamma}$.
- (3) Bob transmits his private binary sequence to Alice by transmitting an element equal to 1 in $\hat{\Gamma}$ (and therefore also in Γ') in place of “1” and an element not equal to 1 in Γ' in place of “0”.
- (4) Alice recovers Bob’s binary sequence by first converting elements of Γ' to the corresponding (under the isomorphism that she knows) elements of Γ , and then solving the word problem in Γ .

Most parts of this protocol are rather nontrivial and open several interesting research avenues. We discuss parts (1), (2), (3) in our Sections 3, 4, 5, respectively.

A priori it looks like the most nontrivial part is finding an element which is not equal to 1 in Γ' since Bob does not even know the whole presentation Γ' . We solve this problem by “going with the flow”, so to speak. More specifically, we just let Bob select a random (well, almost random) word of sufficiently big length and show that, with overwhelming probability, such an element is not equal to 1 in Γ' . We discuss this in more detail in Section 5.

We emphasize once again what is, in our opinion, the main advantage (at least, theoretical) of our protocol over the existing ones. The point is to deprive the adversary (Eve) from attacking the protocol by doing an “exhaustive search”, which is the most obvious (although, perhaps, often “computationally infeasible”) way to attack all existing public key protocol.

The way we plan to achieve our goal is relevant to part (3) of the above protocol, more specifically, to solving the word problem in $\hat{\Gamma}$. If Bob transmits an element g equal to 1 in $\hat{\Gamma}$, Eve may be able to detect this by going over all products of all conjugates of relators from $\hat{\Gamma}$ and their inverses. This set is recursive, but as we have pointed out in the Introduction, there are groups G with efficiently solvable word problem and words w of length n equal to 1 in G , such that the length of a proof verifying that $w = 1$ in G is not bounded by any tower of exponents in n , see [18].

Furthermore, if Bob transmits an element g not equal to 1 in $\hat{\Gamma}$, then detecting this is even more difficult for Eve. In fact, it is impossible in general; Eve’s only hope here is that she will be lucky to find a factor group of $\hat{\Gamma}$ where the word problem is solvable, and that $g \neq 1$ in that factor group. This is what we call a *quotient attack*, see our Section 8.

Remark 1. *It may look like an encryption protocol with the features outlined in the Introduction cannot exist; in particular, the following attack by a computationally superior adversary, Eve, may seem viable:*

Eve can perform key generations over and over again, each time with fresh randomness, until the public key to be attacked is obtained – this will happen eventually with overwhelming probability. Already the correctness (no matter if perfect or only with overwhelming probability) of the scheme guarantees that the corresponding secret key (as obtained by Eve while performing key generation) allows to decrypt illegitimately.

This would be indeed viable if the correctness of the legitimate decryption by Alice was perfect. However, in our situation this kind of attack will not work for a general $\hat{\Gamma}$. Suppose Eve is building up two lists, corresponding to two possible encryptions “ $0 \rightarrow w \neq 1$ in $\hat{\Gamma}$ ” or “ $1 \rightarrow w = 1$ in $\hat{\Gamma}$ ” by Bob. Our first observation is that the list that corresponds to “ $0 \rightarrow w \neq 1$ ” is useless to Eve because it is simply going to contain all words in the alphabet $X = \{x_1, \dots, x_n, x_1^{-1}, \dots, x_n^{-1}\}$ since Bob is choosing such w simply as a random word. Therefore, Eve may just as well forget about this list and concentrate on the other one, that corresponds to “ $1 \rightarrow w = 1$ ”.

Now the situation boils down to the following: if a word w transmitted by Bob appears on the list, then it is equal to 1 in G . If not, then not. The only problem is: how can Eve possibly conclude

that w does not appear on the list if the list is infinite? Our opponent could say here that Eve can stop at some point and conclude that $w \neq 1$ with overwhelming probability, just like Alice does. The point however is that this probability may not at all be as “overwhelming” as the probability of the correct decryption by Alice. Compare:

- (1) For Alice to decrypt correctly “with overwhelming probability”, the probability $P_1(N)$ for a random word w of length N not to be equal to 1 should converge to 1 (reasonably fast) as N goes to infinity.
- (2) For Eve to decrypt correctly “with overwhelming probability”, the probability $P_2(N, f(N))$ for a random word w of length N , which is equal to 1, generated by Bob’s algorithm (see Section 5), to have a proof of length $\leq f(N)$ verifying that $w = 1$, should converge to 1 (reasonably fast) as N goes to infinity. Here $f(N)$ represents Eve’s computational capabilities; this function can be arbitrary, but fixed. By “proof” here we mean a presentation of w as a product of conjugates of defining relators and their inverses.

We see that the functions $P_1(N)$ and $P_2(N)$ are of very different nature, and any correlation between them is unlikely. We note that the function $P_1(N)$ is generally well understood, and in particular, it is known that in any infinite group G , $P_1(N)$ indeed converges to 1 as N goes to infinity; see our Section 5 for more details.

On the other hand, the functions $P_2(N, f(N))$ are more complex; they are currently subject of a very active research, and in particular, it appears likely that for any $f(N)$, there are groups in which $P_2(N, f(N))$ does not converge to 1 at all. Of course, $P_2(N, f(N))$ may depend on a particular algorithm used by Bob to produce words equal to 1, but we leave this discussion to another paper.

We also note, in passing, that if in a group G the word problem is recursively unsolvable, then the length of a proof verifying that $w = 1$ in G is not bounded by any recursive function of the length of w .

To conclude this section, we guide the reader to other sections of this paper where the questions of efficiency (for legitimate parties) are addressed. All steps of our protocol are shown to be quite efficient with the suggested parameters (the latter are summarized in Section 6). Step (2) of the protocol (Alice’s algorithm for obtaining her public and private keys) is discussed in Section 4. Step (3) (encryption by Bob) is discussed in Section 5. It turns out that encryption (of one bit) takes quadratic time in the length of a transmitted word; the latter is approximately 150 on average, according to our computer experiments. Step (4) (decryption by Alice) is discussed at the end of Section 4. It is straightforward to see that the time Alice needs to decrypt each transmitted word w is bounded by $C \cdot |w|$, where $|w|$ is the length of w and C is a constant which basically depends on Alice’s private isomorphism between Γ and Γ' .

The fact that Alice (the receiver) and the adversary are separated in power is essentially due to Alice’s knowledge of her private isomorphism between Γ and Γ' (note that Bob does *not* have to know this isomorphism for encryption!).

We have to admit here one disadvantage of our protocol compared to most well-established public key protocols: we have encryption with a rather big “expansion factor”. Computer experiments show that, with suggested parameters, one bit in Bob’s message gets encrypted into a word of length approximately 150 on average. This is the price we have to pay for granting the adversary too much computational power.

Finally, we touch upon semantic security in the end of Section 5.

3. POOL OF GROUP PRESENTATIONS

There are many classes of finitely presented groups with solvable word problem known by now, e.g. one-relator groups, hyperbolic groups, nilpotent groups, metabelian groups. Note however

that Alice should be able to randomly select a presentation from the pool *efficiently*, which imposes some restrictions on classes of presentations that can be used in this context. The class of finitely presented groups that we suggest to include in our pool is *small cancellation groups*.

Small cancellation groups have relators satisfying a simple (and efficiently verifiable) “metric condition” (we follow the exposition in [14]). More specifically, let $F(X)$ be the free group with a basis $X = \{x_i \mid i \in I\}$, where I is an indexing set. Let $\epsilon_k \in \{\pm 1\}$, where $1 \leq k \leq n$. A word $w(x_1, \dots, x_n) = x_{i_1}^{\epsilon_1} x_{i_2}^{\epsilon_2} \cdots x_{i_n}^{\epsilon_n}$ in $F(X)$, with all x_{i_k} not necessarily distinct, is a *reduced X -word* if $x_{i_k}^{\epsilon_k} \neq x_{i_{k+1}}^{-\epsilon_{k+1}}$, for $1 \leq k \leq n-1$. In addition, the word $w(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ is *cyclically reduced* if it is a reduced X -word and $x_{i_1}^{\epsilon_1} \neq x_{i_n}^{-\epsilon_n}$. A set R containing cyclically reduced words from $F(X)$ is *symmetrized* if it is closed under cyclic permutations and taking inverses.

Let G be a group with presentation $\langle X; R \rangle$. A non-empty word $u \in F(X)$ is called a *piece* if there are two distinct relators $r_1, r_2 \in R$ of G such that $r_1 = uv_1$ and $r_2 = uv_2$ for some $v_1, v_2 \in F(X)$, with no cancellation between u and v_1 or between u and v_2 . The group G belongs to the class $C(p)$ if no element of R is a product of fewer than p pieces. Also, the group G belongs to the class $C'(\lambda)$ if for every $r \in R$ such that $r = uv$ and u is a piece, one has $|u| < \lambda|r|$.

In particular, if G belongs to the class $C'(\frac{1}{6})$, then Dehn’s algorithm solves the word problem for G efficiently. This algorithm is very simple: in a given word w , look for a “large” piece of a relator from R (that means, a piece whose length is more than a half of the length of the whole relator). If no such piece exists, then $w \neq 1$ in G . If such a piece, call it u , does exist, then $r = uv$ for some $r \in R$, where the length of v is smaller than that of u . Then replace u by v^{-1} in w . The length of the resulting word is smaller than that of w ; therefore, the algorithm will terminate in a finite number of steps. It has quadratic time complexity with respect to the length of w .

We also note that a generic finitely presented group is a small cancellation group (see [2]); therefore, to randomly select a small cancellation group, Alice can just take a few random words and check whether the corresponding symmetrized set satisfies the condition for $C'(\frac{1}{6})$. If not, then repeat.

To conclude this section, we give a more specific recipe for Alice to produce a presentation Γ for the protocol in Section 2.

- (1) Alice fixes a number k , $10 \leq k \leq 20$, of generators in her presentation Γ . Her Γ will therefore have generators x_1, \dots, x_k .
- (2) Alice selects m random words r_1, \dots, r_m in the generators x_1, \dots, x_k . Here $10 \leq m \leq 30$ and the lengths l_i of r_i are random integers from the interval $L_1 \leq l_i \leq L_2$. Particular values that we suggest are: $L_1 = 12$, $L_2 = 20$. Thus, Alice obtains a presentation Γ .
- (3) Alice applies a sequence of Tietze transformations (as described in the next Section 4) to obtain a diffused presentation Γ' . Then she discards approximately half of the relators (selected randomly) and obtains the abridged diffused presentation $\hat{\Gamma}$.
- (4) After Alice obtains the abridged presentation $\hat{\Gamma}$, she adds a relation

$$x'_i = \prod_{j=1}^M [x'_i, w_j]$$

to it, where x'_i is a (randomly chosen) generator from $\hat{\Gamma}$, w_j are random elements of length 1 or 2 in the generators x'_1, x'_2, \dots , and $M = 10$. (Our commutator notation is: $[a, b] = a^{-1}b^{-1}ab$.) This relation is needed to foil *quotient attacks*, see Section 8. Then Alice finds the preimage of this relation under the isomorphism between Γ and $\hat{\Gamma}$ and adds this preimage to the defining relators of Γ . Thus, Γ finally has k generators and $m + 1$ defining relators.

- (5) Alice checks whether the final presentation Γ satisfies the small cancellation condition $C'(\frac{1}{6})$ (it will with overwhelming probability, see [2]). If not, then she has to start over.

4. TIETZE TRANSFORMATIONS: ELEMENTARY ISOMORPHISMS

In this section, we explain how Alice can implement step (2) of the protocol given in the Introduction. First we introduce Tietze transformations; these are “elementary isomorphisms”: any isomorphism between finitely presented groups is a composition of Tietze transformations. What is important to us is that every Tietze transformation is easily invertible, and therefore Alice can compute the inverse isomorphism that takes Γ' to Γ .

Tietze introduced isomorphism-preserving elementary transformations that can be applied to groups presented by generators and relators. They are of the following types.

- (T1):** *Introducing a new generator:* Replace $\langle x_1, x_2, \dots \mid r_1, r_2, \dots \rangle$ by $\langle y, x_1, x_2, \dots \mid ys^{-1}, r_1, r_2, \dots \rangle$, where $s = s(x_1, x_2, \dots)$ is an arbitrary element in the generators x_1, x_2, \dots .
- (T2):** *Canceling a generator* (this is the converse of (T1)): If we have a presentation of the form $\langle y, x_1, x_2, \dots \mid q, r_1, r_2, \dots \rangle$, where q is of the form ys^{-1} , and s, r_1, r_2, \dots are in the group generated by x_1, x_2, \dots , replace this presentation by $\langle x_1, x_2, \dots \mid r_1, r_2, \dots \rangle$.
- (T3):** *Applying an automorphism:* Apply an automorphism of the free group generated by x_1, x_2, \dots to all the relators r_1, r_2, \dots .
- (T4):** *Changing defining relators:* Replace the set r_1, r_2, \dots of defining relators by another set r'_1, r'_2, \dots with the same normal closure. That means, each of r'_1, r'_2, \dots should belong to the normal subgroup generated by r_1, r_2, \dots , and vice versa.

Tietze has proved (see e.g. [14]) that two groups $\langle x_1, x_2, \dots \mid r_1, r_2, \dots \rangle$ and $\langle x_1, x_2, \dots \mid s_1, s_2, \dots \rangle$ are isomorphic if and only if one can get from one of the presentations to the other by a sequence of transformations (T1)–(T4).

For each Tietze transformation of the types (T1)–(T3), it is easy to obtain an explicit isomorphism (as a mapping on generators) and its inverse. For a Tietze transformation of the type (T4), the isomorphism is just the identity map. We would like here to make Tietze transformations of the type (T4) recursive, because *a priori* it is not clear how Alice can actually apply these transformations. Thus, Alice is going to use the following recursive version of (T4):

- (T4')** In the set r_1, r_2, \dots , replace some r_i by one of the: r_i^{-1} , $r_i r_j$, $r_i r_j^{-1}$, $r_j r_i$, $r_j r_i^{-1}$, $x_k^{-1} r_i x_k$, $x_k r_i x_k^{-1}$, where $j \neq i$, and k is arbitrary.

We suggest that in part (2) of the protocol in Section 2, Alice should first apply several transformations of the type (T4') to “mix” the presentation Γ . (This does not add complexity to the final isomorphism since for a Tietze transformation of the type (T4), the isomorphism is just the identity map, as we have noted above.) In particular, if Γ was a small cancellation presentation (see Section 3) to begin with, then after applying several transformations (T4') it will, most likely, no longer be. As a result, Eve’s chances to augment the public presentation $\hat{\Gamma}$ to a small cancellation presentation (see Section 7) are getting slimmer.

One more trick that Alice can use for better diffusion of her presentation is making a free product of her group with the trivial group given by a non-standard presentation. That means, she can add new generators z_1, \dots, z_q and new relators $s_1(z_1, \dots, z_q), \dots, s_t(z_1, \dots, z_q)$, such that the presentation $\langle z_1, \dots, z_q \mid s_1, \dots, s_t \rangle$ defines the trivial group. After that, she has to apply several (T3)s and (T4')s to mix the new generators with the old ones. We note that there are many non-trivial presentations of the trivial group to choose from; for example, in [16], there are given several infinite series of such presentations in the special case where $t = q$ (so-called *balanced presentations*). Without this restriction, there are even more choices; in particular, Alice can just

add arbitrary relators to a balanced presentation of the trivial group, thus adding to the confusion of the adversary.

After Alice has mixed Γ by using these tricks, we suggest that she should aim for breaking down some of the defining relators into “small pieces”. More formally, she can replace a given presentation by an isomorphic presentation where most defining relators have length at most 4. (Intuitively, diffusion of elements should be easier to achieve in a group with shorter defining relators). This is easily achieved by applying transformations (T1) (see below) which can be “seasoned” by a few elementary automorphisms (type (T3)) of the form $x_i \rightarrow x_i x_j^{\pm 1}$ or $x_i \rightarrow x_j^{\pm 1} x_i$, for better diffusion.

The procedure of breaking down defining relators is quite simple. Let Γ be a presentation $\langle x_1, \dots, x_k; r_1, \dots, r_m \rangle$. We are going to obtain a different, isomorphic, presentation by using Tietze transformations of types (T1). Specifically, let, say, $r_1 = x_i x_j u$, $1 \leq i, j \leq k$. We introduce a new generator x_{k+1} and a new relator $r_{m+1} = x_{k+1}^{-1} x_i x_j$. The presentation

$\langle x_1, \dots, x_k, x_{k+1}; r_1, \dots, r_m, r_{m+1} \rangle$ is obviously isomorphic to Γ . Now if we replace r_1 with $r'_1 = x_{k+1} u$, then the presentation $\langle x_1, \dots, x_k, x_{k+1}; r'_1, \dots, r_m, r_{m+1} \rangle$ will again be isomorphic to Γ , but now the length of one of the defining relators (r_1) has decreased by 1. Continuing in this manner, Alice can eventually obtain a presentation where many relators have length at most 3, at the expense of introducing more generators. In fact, relators of length 4 are also good for the purpose of diffusing a given word, so we are not going to “cut” the relators into too small pieces (i.e., we do not want pieces of length 1 or 2), but rather settle with relators of length 3 or 4. Most of the longer relators can be discarded from the presentation Γ' to obtain the abridged presentation $\hat{\Gamma}$.

We conclude this section with a simple example, just to illustrate how Tietze transformations can be used to cut relators into pieces. In this example, we start with a presentation having two relators of length 5 in 3 generators, and end up with a presentation having 4 relators of length 3 or 4 in 5 generators. The symbol \cong below means “is isomorphic to”.

Example. $\langle x_1, x_2, x_3 \mid x_1^2 x_2^3, x_1 x_2^2 x_1^{-1} x_3 \rangle \cong \langle x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4 \mid x_4 = x_1^2, x_4 x_2^3, x_1 x_2^2 x_1^{-1} x_3 \rangle$
 $\cong \langle x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5 \mid x_5 = x_1 x_2^2, x_4 = x_1^2, x_4 x_2^3, x_5 x_1^{-1} x_3 \rangle \cong$
 $\langle x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5 \mid x_5 = x_2^2, x_4 = x_1^2, x_4 x_2^3, x_1 x_5 x_1^{-1} x_3 \rangle.$

The last isomorphism illustrates applying a transformation of type (T3), namely, the automorphism $x_5 \rightarrow x_1 x_5$, $x_i \rightarrow x_i$, $i \neq 5$.

5. GENERATING RANDOM ELEMENTS IN FINITELY PRESENTED GROUPS

In this section, we explain how to implement the crucial step (3) of the protocol given in Section 2.

When Bob wants to transmit an element equal to 1 in $\hat{\Gamma}$, he should construct a word, looking “as random as possible” (for semantic security), in the relators $\hat{r}_1, \dots, \hat{r}_l$ and their conjugates. When he wants to transmit an element not equal to 1 in $\hat{\Gamma}$, he just selects a random word of sufficiently big length; it turns out that, with overwhelming probability, such an element is not equal to 1 in Γ' (we explain it in the end of this section).

We start with a description of Bob’s possible diffusion strategy for producing elements equal to 1 in $\hat{\Gamma}$. (It is rather straightforward to produce a random word of a given length in generators x_1, \dots, x_k , so we are not going to discuss it here.) When Bob transmits a word w equal to 1 in $\hat{\Gamma}$, he wants to diffuse it so that large pieces of defining relators would not be visible in w . In some specific groups (e.g. in braid groups) a diffusion is provided by a “normal form”, which is a collection of symbols that uniquely corresponds to a given element of the group. The existence of such normal forms is usually due to some special algebraic or geometric properties of a given group.

However, since Bob does not know any meaningful properties of the group defined by the presentation $\hat{\Gamma}$ which is given to him, he cannot employ normal forms in the usual sense. The only

useful property that the presentation $\hat{\Gamma}$ has is that most of its defining relators have length 3 or 4, see Section 3. We are going to take advantage of this property as follows. We suggest the following procedure which is probably best described by the word “shuffling”.

- (1) Make a product of the form $u = s_1 \cdots s_p$, where each s_i is randomly chosen among defining relators $\hat{r}_1, \hat{r}_2, \dots$, of length 3 or 4, their inverses, and their conjugates by one- or two-letter words in x'_1, x'_2, \dots . The number p of factors should be sufficiently big, at least 10 times the number of defining relators in $\hat{\Gamma}$.
- (2) Insert approximately $\frac{2p}{k}$ expressions of the form $x'_j(x'_j)^{-1}$ or $(x'_j)^{-1}x'_j$ in random places of the word u (here k is the number of generators x'_i of $\hat{\Gamma}$), for random values of j .
- (3) Going left to right in the word u , look for two-letter subwords that are parts of defining relators \hat{r}_i of length 3 or 4. When you spot such a subword, replace it by the inverse of the augmenting part of the same defining relator and continue. For example, suppose there is a relator $\hat{r}_i = x'_1x'_2x'_3x'_4$, and suppose you spot the subword $x'_1x'_2$ in u . Then replace it by $(x'_4)^{-1}(x'_3)^{-1}$ (obviously, $x'_1x'_2 = (x'_4)^{-1}(x'_3)^{-1}$ in your group). If you spot the subword $x'_2x'_3$ in w , replace it by $(x'_1)^{-1}(x'_4)^{-1}$. If there is more than one choice for replacement, choose randomly between them.
- (4) Cancel remaining subwords (if any) of the form $x'_j(x'_j)^{-1}$ or $(x'_j)^{-1}x'_j$.

Steps (2)–(4) should be repeated approximately p times for good mixing.

Finally, after Bob has obtained a word u this way, he sets $w = [x'_i, u]$ and applies steps (2)–(4) to w approximately $\frac{|w|}{2}$ times, where $|w|$ is the length of w . This final step is needed to make this w (which is equal to 1 in $\hat{\Gamma}$, and therefore also in Γ') indistinguishable from $w \neq 1$, which is constructed in the same form $w = [x'_i, u]$, see below. Here x'_i is the same as in the relator $x'_i = \prod_{j=1}^M [x'_i, w_j]$ published by Alice, see Section 3. Having $w \neq 1$ in this form is needed, in turn, to foil “quotient attacks”, see the end of Section 8.

When Bob wants to transmit an element not equal to 1 in Γ' , he should first choose a random word u from the commutator subgroup of the free group generated by x'_1, x'_2, \dots . To select a random word from the commutator subgroup is easy; Bob can select an arbitrary random word v first, and then adjust the exponents on the generators in v so that the exponent sum on every generator in v is 0. The length of u should be in the same range as the lengths of the words u equal to 1 in $\hat{\Gamma}$ constructed by Bob before. Then Bob lets $w = [x'_i, u]$, where x'_i is the same as in the relator $x'_i = \prod_{j=1}^M [x'_i, w_j]$ published by Alice, see Section 3. Finally, to hide u , he applies “shuffling” to w (steps (2)–(4) above) approximately $\frac{|w|}{2}$ times, where $|w|$ is the length of w .

Now we explain why a random word of sufficiently big length is not equal to 1 in Γ with overwhelming probability, provided Γ is a presentation described in the end of Section 3.

Like any other group, the group G given by the presentation Γ is a factor group $G = F/R$ of the ambient free group F generated by x_1, x_2, \dots . Therefore, to estimate the probability that a random word in x_1, x_2, \dots would not belong to R (and therefore, would not be equal to 1 in G), one should estimate the *asymptotic density* (see e.g. [10]) of the complement to R in the free group F . It makes notation simpler if one deals instead with the asymptotic density of R itself, which is

$$\rho_F(R) = \limsup_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\#\{u \in R : l(u) \leq n\}}{\#\{u \in F : l(u) \leq n\}}.$$

Here $l(u)$ denotes the usual lexicographic length of u as a word in x_1, x_2, \dots . Thus, the asymptotic density depends, in general, on a free generating set of F , but we will not go into these details here because all facts that we are going to need are independent of the choice of basis. One principal fact that we can use here is due to Woess [22]: if the group $G = F/R$ is infinite, then $\rho_F(R) = 0$. Since

the group G given by the presentation Γ is infinite (see our Section 3), this already tells us that the probability for a random word of length n in x_1, x_2, \dots not to be equal to 1 in G is approaching 1 when $n \rightarrow \infty$. However, if we want words transmitted by Bob to be of reasonable length (on the order of 100–200, say), we have to address the question of *how fast* the ratio in the definition of the asymptotic density converges to 0 if R is the normal closure of the relators described in the end of Section 3. It turns out that for *non-amenable* groups the convergence is exponentially fast; this is also due to Woess [22]. We are not going to explain here what amenable groups are; it is sufficient for us to know that small cancellation groups are not amenable (because they have free subgroups, see e.g. [14]). Thus, small cancellation groups are just fine for our purposes here: the probability for a random word of length n in x_1, x_2, \dots not to be equal to 1 in G is approaching 1 exponentially fast when $n \rightarrow \infty$.

Finally, we touch upon semantic security (see [8]) of the words transmitted by Bob. We do not give any rigorous probabilistic estimates since this would require at least defining a probability measure on an infinite group, which is a very nontrivial problem by itself (cf. [6]). Instead, we offer here an informal argument which we hope to be convincing. A nice thing about Bob's encryption procedure is that when he selects a word $u \neq 1$, he simply selects a random word. Thus, $u \neq 1$ is indistinguishable from a random word just because it is random! Then, the element $w = [x'_i, u]$, which is transmitted by Bob, looks like it is no longer random because it is of a special form. However:

- (1) What is actually transmitted by Bob is a *word in the alphabet* x'_1, x'_2, \dots representing the element $w = [x'_i, u]$ of the group defined by $\hat{\Gamma}$. This word is *not* of the form $[x'_i, u]$ because Bob has applied a “shuffling” to w .
- (2) Given the specifics of our protocol, what really matters is that transmitted words equal to 1 in $\hat{\Gamma}$ are indistinguishable from transmitted words not equal to 1. This is why we require Bob's elements representing 1 in $\hat{\Gamma}$ to be of the form $[x'_i, u]$ as well.

Thus, the question about semantic security of Bob's transmissions boils down to the following question of independent interest: is a word u representing 1 in $\hat{\Gamma}$ indistinguishable from a random word (of the same length)? As we have admitted above, we do not have a rigorous proof that it is, but computer experiments show that when most of the relators in $\hat{\Gamma}$ have length at most 4, then the words u representing 1 in $\hat{\Gamma}$, obtained as described earlier in this section, pass at least the equal frequency test for 1-, 2-, and 3-letter subwords, thus making it appear likely that the answer to the question above is affirmative for such $\hat{\Gamma}$.

6. SUGGESTED PARAMETERS

In this section, we summarize all suggested parameters of our protocol for the reader's convenience, although most of these parameters were already discussed in previous sections.

- (1) The number of generators x_i in Alice's private presentation Γ is k , a random integer from the interval $10 \leq k \leq 20$.
- (2) Relators r_1, \dots, r_m in Alice's private presentation Γ are random words in the generators x_1, \dots, x_k . Here m is a random integer from the interval $10 \leq m \leq 30$, and the lengths l_i of r_i are random integers from the interval $12 \leq l_i \leq 20$. There is one other, special, relator in Γ , which is obtained as described in the end of Section 3.
- (3) Alice's private isomorphism (between the presentations Γ and Γ') is a product, in random order, of s_1 elementary transformations of type (T1) and s_2 elementary transformations of type (T3) (see Section 4). Each relator introduced by a transformation of type (T1) is a random word whose length is a random integer from the interval $[12, 20]$. Neither of the parameters s_1, s_2 is specified, but their sum should be at least 50; more specifically, as soon

as $s_1 + s_2$ becomes equal to 50, only transformations of type (T1) are applied, targeted at making about 30% of the relators to have length at most 4, as described in Section 4. After that, Alice should discard about 70% of the relators, taking care that among the remaining relators, at least 50% have length at most 4.

- (4) Bob encrypts his secret bits by words in the given alphabet, as described in Section 5. Here we specify the length of those words. Recall that Bob starts building a word $w = 1$ in Γ' as a product of p words randomly chosen among published defining relators, their inverses, and their conjugates by one- or two-letter words in the published generators. We specify p as a random integer from the interval $5 \leq p \leq 12$, thus making the whole w a word of length approximately 150 on average. Computer experiments show that subsequent “shuffling”, as described in Section 5, only slightly increases the length of w .

Finally, we recall that Bob selects a word $w \neq 1$ in Γ' in the form $[x'_i, u]$, where u is a random word from the commutator subgroup of the free group generated by the published generators x'_1, x'_2, \dots . We therefore specify u as a random word of length l , where l is a random integer from the interval $65 \leq l \leq 85$. Then the length of $w = [x'_i, u]$, which is $2l + 2$, is going to be approximately 150 on average, just as in the case of $w = 1$ considered above.

7. ISOMORPHISM ATTACK

In this section, we discuss a (theoretically) possible “brute force” attack on the protocol from Section 2.

Knowing the pool of group presentations from which Alice selects her private presentation Γ , Eve can try to augment the public presentation $\hat{\Gamma}$ to a presentation that would be isomorphic to one from the pool. Theoretically, this is possible because the pool is recursive and because the set of finite presentations isomorphic to a given one is recursive, too. However, this procedure requires enormous resources. Let us take a closer look at it.

Eve can add to $\hat{\Gamma}$ one element at a time and check whether the resulting presentation, call it $\hat{\Gamma}_+$, is isomorphic to one of the presentations from Alice’s pool. The latter is done the following way. Suppose Eve wants to check whether $\hat{\Gamma}_+$ is isomorphic to some Γ_i . She goes over mappings from Γ_i to $\hat{\Gamma}_+$, one at a time, defined on the generators of Γ_i . At the same time, she also goes over mappings from $\hat{\Gamma}_+$ to Γ_i defined on the generators of $\hat{\Gamma}_+$. She composes various pairs of these mappings and checks: (1) whether she gets the identical mapping on Γ_i , and (2) whether both mappings in such a pair are homomorphisms, i.e., whether they send relators of either presentation to elements equal to 1 in the other presentation. Having the word problem in Γ_i solvable makes the former checking more efficient, but it is, in fact, not necessary because what matters here is the “yes” part of the word problem, which is always recursive.

Now let us focus on the part of this procedure where Eve works with a particular presentation Γ_i from Alice’s pool. Suppose Γ_i is not isomorphic to $\hat{\Gamma}_+$. Since the “no” part of the isomorphism problem between $\hat{\Gamma}_+$ and Γ_i is not recursive, Eve would have to try out various pairs of mappings between $\hat{\Gamma}_+$ and Γ_i (see above) indefinitely. Therefore, she will have to allocate (indefinitely) some memory resources to checking this particular Γ_i . Since the number of Γ_i grows exponentially with the size of the presentation (which is the total length of relators), Eve would require essentially unlimited storage space and, in fact, she will reach physical limits (e.g. the number of electrons in the universe) on the storage space very quickly because, say, the number of presentations on 6 generators with the total length of relators bounded by 100 is already more than 10^{100} .

We note that there seems to be no way to bypass these storage space requirements, even assuming that Eve enjoys arbitrarily high (but fixed) computational speed. She basically has two options: (1) to run in parallel subroutines corresponding to each Γ_i , until one of the subroutines finds Γ_i

isomorphic to $\hat{\Gamma}_+$; (2) to enumerate all steps in all subroutines the same way that one enumerates rational numbers (so that Step i in the Subroutine j corresponds to the rational number $\frac{i}{j}$).

The first option obviously requires essentially unlimited storage space. With the second option, it may look like just having arbitrarily high computational speed would be sufficient for Eve. However, since under this arrangement Eve would have to interrupt each subroutine and then return to it, she would have to at least store the information indicating where she left off each particular subroutine. Therefore, since the number of subroutines is huge, she would again reach physical limits on the storage space very quickly.

8. QUOTIENT ATTACK

In this section, we discuss an attack which is, in general, more efficient (especially in real life) than the “brute force” attack described in Section 7. We use here some group-theoretic terminology not supported by formal definitions when we feel it should not affect the reader’s understanding of the material. Some of the basic terminology has to be introduced though.

A group G is called *abelian* (or commutative) if $[a, b] = 1$ for any $a, b \in G$, where $[a, b]$ is the notation for $a^{-1}b^{-1}ab$. Thus, $[a, b] = 1$ is equivalent to $ab = ba$. This can be generalized in different ways. A group G is called *metabelian* if $[[x, y], [z, t]] = 1$ for any $x, y, z, t \in G$. A group G is called *nilpotent of class $c \geq 1$* if $[y_1, y_2, \dots, y_{c+1}] = 1$ for any $y_1, y_2, \dots, y_{c+1} \in G$, where $[y_1, y_2, y_3] = [[y_1, y_2], y_3]$, etc.

We note that in the definition of an abelian group, it is sufficient to require that $[x_i, x_j] = 1$ for all *generators* x_i, x_j of the group G . Thus, *any finitely generated abelian group is finitely presented*. The same is true for all finitely generated nilpotent groups of any class $c \geq 1$, but not for all metabelian groups. In particular, it is known that finitely generated *free metabelian groups* are infinitely presented [4]. (A free metabelian group is the factor group $F/[[F, F], [F, F]]$ of a free group by the second commutator subgroup.)

Now we get to quotient attacks. One way for Eve to try to positively identify those places in Bob’s binary sequence where he intended to transmit a 0 is to use a *quotient test* (see e.g. [10] for a general background). That means the following: Eve tries to add finitely or infinitely many relators to the given presentation $\hat{\Gamma}$ to obtain a presentation defining a group H with solvable word problem (more accurately, a group H that Eve can *recognize* as having solvable word problem).

It makes sense for Eve to only try recognizable quotients, such as, for example, abelian or, more generally, nilpotent ones. This amounts to adding specific relators to $\hat{\Gamma}$; for example, for an abelian quotient, Eve can add relators $[x'_i, x'_j]$ for all pairs of generators x'_i, x'_j in $\hat{\Gamma}$. For nilpotent quotients, Eve will have to add commutators of higher weight in the generators. For a metabelian quotient, Eve will have to add infinitely many relators (because, as we have already mentioned, free metabelian groups are infinitely presented), but this is not a problem since she does not have to “actually add” those relators; she can just consider $\hat{\Gamma}$ as a presentation *in the variety of metabelian groups* and apply the relevant algorithm for solving the word problem which is universal for all groups finitely presented in the variety of metabelian groups.

Note that this trick will *not* work with hyperbolic quotients, say. This is because there is no way, in general, to add specific relators (finitely or infinitely many) to $\hat{\Gamma}$ to make sure that the extended presentation defines a hyperbolic group. This deprives Eve from using a (rather powerful, cf. [10]) hyperbolic quotient attack.

Classes of groups with solvable word problem are summarized in the survey [11]. It appears that a quotient attack can essentially employ either a nilpotent or a metabelian quotient of $\hat{\Gamma}$. This is why, to foil such attacks, Alice adds a relator $x'_i = \prod_{j=1}^M [x'_i, w_j]$ to $\hat{\Gamma}$ (see our Section 3). This is also the reason why Bob should choose a word of the form $[x'_i, u]$ when he wants to transmit an element not equal to 1 in Γ' (see Section 5). Indeed, a metabelian quotient attack on an element of the form

$[x'_i, u]$ will not work because this element belongs to the second commutator subgroup of the group defined by $\hat{\Gamma}$ since in this group, $x'_i = \prod_{j=1}^M [x'_i, w_j]$, so x'_i belongs to the commutator subgroup of the given group. Furthermore, an element of the form $[x'_i, u]$ belongs to every term of the lower central series of the given group since in this group, $[x'_i, u] = [\prod_{j=1}^M [x'_i, w_j], u] = [\prod_{j=1}^M [\prod_{j=1}^M [x'_i, w_j], w_j], u]$, etc. This foils nilpotent quotient attacks, too.

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